Healthy and chronically-ill children's generalisation of illness to biological and non-biological categories by Buchanan-Barrow, E et al.
Infant and Child Development (2004), 13, 435-450
HEALTHY AND CHRONICALLY-ILL CHILDREN’S GENERALISATION OF
ILLNESS TO BIOLOGICAL AND NON-BIOLOGICAL CATEGORIES
Eithne Buchanan-Barrow, Martyn Barrett and Mariangela Bati.
University of Surrey, Guildford Surrey, GU2 7XH
Correspondence to: Dr Eithne Buchanan-Barrow, Department of Psychology,
University of Surrey, Guildford, GU2 7XH.
Tel: 01483 686871
Fax: 01483 689553
Email: eithne.buchanan-barrow@surrey.ac.uk
Short title: children’s reasoning about biological categories
2Abstract
Using children’s naïve theory of biology as a framework, this study investigated
children’s developing understanding of illness by examining their generalisation of
illness to biological and non-biological categories. In addition to differences associated
with age, the children’s health status was investigated for any possible links with their
understanding. Healthy and chronically-ill children, aged 4-11 years, were randomly
assigned to one of three conditions, according to which exemplar (child, dog or duck)
was described as suffering from an imaginary illness. Using a card-sorting technique,
the children assessed whether each entity out of 30 entities (five representatives in each
of six categories: humans, mammals, non-mammals, birds, plants and artifacts) could be
afflicted by that illness. The children’s generalisations indicated a grasp of the
distinctiveness of the various categories, although they seemed less certain about the
biological status of plants. Furthermore, the type of exemplar on which the children had
been taught influenced their responses. However, the children’s reasoning appeared
unaffected by their health status and largely unaffected by age or gender.
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3Introduction
The development of children’s beliefs about health and illness has significant practical
implications for educating chronically-ill children about their disease, medical treatment
and hospital admission, as pediatric patients require the appropriate explanations to
assist their coping with the stress of their illness (Eiser, 1990). Research into children’s
naive theory of biology has proved to be a productive perspective on children’s
biological thinking and offers a theoretical framework for researching children’s
understanding of illness. The ‘theory’ approach postulates that children acquire
content-specific systems of knowledge rather than domain-independent ones, and three
particular domains have been investigated, namely physics, psychology and biology
(Wellman & Gelman, 1992, 1998). According to Wellman (1990), a theory requires
ontological distinctions, coherence and a causal-explanatory framework. Following
Wellman’s general framework, Hatano and Inagaki (1994) propose that there are three
important components involved in biological thinking: 1) knowledge to ascertain the
specific entities which fall within the biological domain; that is the distinction between
the living and the non-living; 2) a mode of inference which permits integrated and
reasonable predictions for attributes or behaviours of biological entities; and 3) a non-
intentional causal explanatory framework for the behaviours relevant to biological
processes.
Therefore, within a ‘theory’ approach, the child is portrayed as capable of forming and
using complex mental structures that function as explanatory systems (Rosser, 1994),
although the approximate age of development of such skills is unclear. With respect to
biology, Carey (1995) believes that young children have a fairly limited ability to
reason about biological systems. She postulates that children’s biological understanding
4develops as a consequence of increased knowledge together with some structural
change, as earlier psychologically-based theories evolve into biological ones. On the
other hand, some studies have suggested that children acquire an understanding of an
autonomous domain of biology at a much younger age, even though they may lack
specific knowledge of biological systems (Keil, 1989; Inagaki & Hatano, 1996).
Within this ‘theory’ perspective, some studies have indicated that children do display
theoretical thinking about illness. For example, investigations of children’s thinking
about illness causality have found that pre-school children have well-developed theories
about the ways certain kinds of illnesses are transmitted (Siegal, 1988; Siegelman et al.,
1993; Inagaki, 1997). However, the most important finding in this area has been that
young children generally hold contagion and contamination to be the most likely causes
of physical problems, regardless of the nature of illness/injury involved (Kister &
Patterson, 1980; Hergenrather & Rabinowitz, 1991; Kalish, 1999). As young children’s
most likely experience of illness is with such infectious illnesses as colds, measles and
chicken-pox, it is perhaps unsurprising that their early model of illness should be based
on contagion and contamination (Campbell, Scadding & Roberts, 1979; Kalish, 1999).
Four possible theories of children’s understanding of the transmission of infection have
been reported in the literature: the associational model, the physical model, the simple-
biological and the differentiated-biological (Kalish, 1999). With the associational
model, children believe that contagion and contamination occur, without any evident
contact, through proximity or magic (Bibace & Walsh, 1980; Frazer, 1981). With the
physical model, children regard actual physical contact as necessary for infection to take
place, but the agents of infection are understood to be inert material entities. In
particular, children attribute this action to germs as the invisible causal agents in illness
5(e.g. Solomon & Cassimatis, 1999; Kalish, 1999). However, with the simple-biological
model, the living nature of germs is fully recognised and thus these agents of infection
are understood to be living organisms which act on other living entities. Finally, with
the differentiated-biological model of infection, the distinctive types and attributes of a
range of infectious agents are acknowledged. While there is little direct evidence that
young children hold a biological concept of infection (Kalish, 1999), Kalish (1996) has
argued that children’s predictions of contagion do involve the idea of an intermediate
mechanism and therefore are not based on simple associations. As children lack the
more detailed and specialised knowledge necessary for a biological understanding of
infection, their reported thinking approximates to a physical model. However, it is also
possible that they hold a co-existence model and that they may not view infection in
uniquely biological ways (Kalish, 1999). In other words, children may have multiple
explanations for infectious processes, simultaneously holding both biological and non-
biological accounts, such as an associational model of infection.
Children who have experienced illnesses other than the common infectious diseases of
childhood might be expected to display a different understanding of illness from that of
normally healthy children, as a consequence of their additional exposure to poor health.
However, investigations of the thinking of sick children about illness have produced
inconclusive findings. While some early work suggested that the understanding of
chronically-ill children remained unaffected by their experiences (Brewster, 1982),
there has been more general agreement that sick children’s thinking is affected,
although the direction of that influence has been disputed. Some studies have proposed
that sick children display a more sophisticated understanding of illness, possibly
because their experiences facilitate their comprehension (Bibace & Walsh, 1980;
Feldman & Varni, 1985; Rubovits & Siegel, 1994). Other studies have proposed an
6interaction between age and experience; with age, chronically-ill children do display
greater illness understanding, while younger children remain unaffected (Campbell,
1975; Redpath & Rogers, 1984; Crisp et al., 1996). On the other hand, other studies
have suggested that the normal development of thinking about health and illness is
actually delayed in chronically ill children (Nagera, 1978: Eiser et al., 1988; Shagena et
al., 1988; Perrin et al., 1991; Sayer et al., 1993), resulting in a less sophisticated
understanding. Berry et al. (1993) highlighted the number of long-term child-sufferers
with Juvenile Rheumatoid Arthritis holding misconceptions about their illness, despite
their routine exposure to information and advice, giving rise to the possibility that some
chronically-sick children are resistant to attempts to inform them about their illness.
However, while the genesis, direction, and extent of any influences on chronically-ill
children’s understanding may be unclear, it is nevertheless evident from these studies
that individual differences in both sick and healthy children is an area which needs
further investigation. Furthermore, there are two points of criticism of the previous
research into healthy versus sick children’s thinking about illness. First, studies have
generally utilised a Piagetian cognitive-developmental perspective, rather than the
‘theory’ approach. However, the naïve theory perspective, with its emphasis on domain-
specific knowledge as opposed to domain-general knowledge, may provide a better
framework for an examination of individual differences. Secondly, most of the previous
research has focused on the children’s knowledge of the facts of illness rather than their
conceptual reasoning about illness. However, an investigation of children’s
understanding of illness, using an hypothetical disease as opposed to ‘real’ illnesses,
should reveal something of their naive theory of illness which may differentiate the
thinking of healthy from that of sick children.
7Therefore, this present study of healthy and sick children’s thinking about illness used
children’s naive theory of biology as the theoretical perspective, with a study by Keil
(1989) providing the general framework. Keil investigated children’s ontological
knowledge of phenomena by exploring their understanding of ontological boundaries
through transformations (e.g. about whether it is possible for a horse to be turned into a
zebra or a cactus into a porcupine). He revealed that children do have an intuitive
taxonomy for structuring the biological domain and that they resist impossible
biological transformations while accepting others as more plausible. Therefore, this
present study also explored children’s ontological boundaries, but using the
generalisation of illness to do so, by examining the extent to which children generalise a
made-up illness, plinkitis, to other biological and non-biological entities. As plinkitis is
not a real disease, the children would not have been able to draw upon any acquired
knowledge about this particular disease in order to answer questions about it, but would
have to use their naive or implicit theories of illness to make their predictions. To that
end, the description of plinkitis was restricted to very basic terms so that children would
not be prompted to associate it with any known illness.
Furthermore, this study examined Carey’s belief that young children view humans as
the prototypical biological entity (Carey, 1995). According to Carey (1995), children
before the age of about 10 extend their thinking to other biological categories according
to the similarity or proximity of other entities to humans. For example, when taught on a
human exemplar, children not only tend to generalise more to other ontological
categories, but the likelihood of such generalisations is greater the closer the links
between the human exemplar and the other entities (Carey, 1995). Therefore, the study
explored children’s generalisation of illness from three different exemplars (child, dog
or duck) in order to examine whether the use of non-human exemplars did result in a
8lower degree of generalisation than for the human exemplar and also to probe for any
differences between the healthy and chronically-sick children. 1
Method
Participants
Two hundred and ninety-one children were randomly recruited from school years
Reception to Year 6 (age range: 4.9-11.9 years) in two primary schools in England. For
the purposes of the analysis the children were grouped into three age-groups: (1)
Young group with 119 children from three school years (Reception, 1, and 2): 59 girls
(mean age = 6.4 years, age range = 4.9–7.8 years) and 60 boys (mean age = 6.2 years,
age range = 4.9-7.8 years). (2) Middle group with 85 children from two school years (3
and 4): 46 girls (mean age = 9.0 years, age range = 7.9-9.9 years) and 39 boys (mean
age = 8.9 years, age range = 8.1-9.9 years). (3) Old group with 87 children from two
school years (5 and 6): 45 girls (mean age = 10.8 years, age range = 9.9-11.8 years) and
42 boys (mean age = 10.9 years, age range = 9.9-11.9 years).
In addition, 96 children (age-range: 4.5-11.8 years) diagnosed as having a chronic
condition participated in the present study: 13 children with cystic fibrosis, 19 children
with diabetes, 14 children with epilepsy, 42 children with asthma, and 8 children with
other conditions such as leukemia, osteogenesis imperfecta, and retinoblastoma. The
children were recruited from a children’s hospital in England. The children were also
grouped into three age-groups: (1) Young group with 44 children: 21 girls (mean age =
1 Note that the present study examined children’s taxonomically horizontal generalisations of illness
across different biological and non-biological entities, in order to examine the extent to which children
understand the ontological boundaries which exist between different categories. In its emphasis on
children’s understanding of horizontal taxonomic relationships and differences, it therefore differs from
the work of Atran (1998), who instead examined people’s understanding of vertical taxonomic biological
relationships (e.g. between bird – vulture – black vulture – red-headed black vulture).
96.5 years, age-range = 4.7-7.8 years) and 23 boys (mean age = 6.3 years, age-range =
4.5-7.8 years); (2) Middle group with 31 children: 17 girls (mean age = 8.8 years, age-
range = 8.8-9.8 years) and 14 boys (mean age = 9.1 years age-range = 8.1-9.8 years);
(3) Old group with 20 children: 6 girls (mean age = 10.6 years, age-range = 10.1-11.7
years) and 14 boys (mean age = 10.4 years, age-range = 10.1-11.8 years). These
children formed the chronically-ill (henceforward CI) group in the study.
All the children’s verbal IQs were measured by the British Picture Vocabulary Scale
(BPVS) (Dunn et al., 1982) in order to ensure that the healthy and chronically-ill
children did not differ in their verbal IQ. A 2 (health status) x 3 (age) ANOVA revealed
no significant differences between the BPVS scores obtained by the healthy and CI
children (Healthy mean score = 102.02, sd = 14.7, CI mean score = 99.53, sd = 18.5),
nor between the three age-groups (Young mean score = 100.93, sd = 16.9, Middle
mean score = 101.24, sd = 15.3, Old mean score = 100.81, sd = 20.3), and there was no
significant interaction between health status and age. There were thus no biases evident
on the BPVS in the samples.
In order to examine any differences between the thinking of children and that of adults,
96 1st year university students were recruited and given exactly the same task to
perform, but in a questionnaire format (mean age = 19.2 years, sd = 1.6).
Materials
Thirty cards, each measuring 5 x 2.5 ins., naming five entities from each of six
ontological categories, were used in the sorting task. On each card, the name of one
entity was written clearly. The ontological categories from which the entity names were
drawn were (a) human beings (man, woman, boy, girl, baby), (b) mammals (elephant,
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cow, sheep, cat, mouse), (c) non-mammals (crocodile, tortoise, frog, butterfly, ant), (d)
birds (turkey, swan, chicken, blackbird, robin), (e) plants (oak tree, apple tree, rose
bush, daffodil, dandelion) and (f) hand-made artifacts (house, car, bicycle, computer,
cup). The generalisation entities were chosen to represent a full range of sizes within
each category. In addition, there were three boxes, measuring 9 x 6.5 x 7 ins., each
clearly labelled with one of the three possible answers given by the children: can get
plinkitis, cannot get plinkitis, I don’t know. Finally, three additional cards were used,
each showing a simple black and white line drawing of one of the exemplars in
reference to which the children were taught about the imaginary illness. The three
exemplars used were a child, a dog and a duck, chosen from the midpoint size of the
categories of human beings, mammals and birds respectively, in order to minimise any
possible restrictions on the children’s generalisations based on size of exemplar.
Procedure
Children were randomly assigned to either the child, dog or duck condition. Healthy
children: Parents gave consent by letter to their children taking part. The children were
tested individually for about fifteen minutes. The child was told that the interviewer was
writing a book for children concerning the body and they were reassured that there were
no right or wrong answers. Immediately after the completion of the task, the short form
of the BPVS was administered to each of the participants. Chronically-ill children: The
parents were told of the study by letter, prior to their child attending the clinic. Ninety-
six children agreed to take part, with seven children declining. Exactly the same
procedure was followed as with the healthy children, again with the children being
interviewed individually.
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The three boxes with open tops without lids were put on the table. Each box represented
one of the possible answers which could be given by the child: can get plinkitis, cannot
get plinkitis, I don’t know. The boxes were placed on the table in the above order for
the first child so that the child could clearly see what was written on each box. For the
second child the order cannot get plinkitis, can get plinkitis, I don’t know was used.
These two orders were alternated accordingly throughout the testing in order to control
for possible left-right response biases. The interviewer then described an illness,
plinkitis, in the following way.
‘Plinkitis is an illness. Here is a picture of a child (dog or duck; depending on
which exemplar the child was taught on). Children (dogs or ducks) can get
plinkitis. When children (dogs or ducks) get plinkitis they feel dizzy and have to
stay really, really still or they feel worse. They also have a high temperature
and they feel very ill.
The interviewer then showed the cards naming the various entities, in a different
randomised order for each child. The children were asked to put each card in the
appropriate box, according to their belief that the particular entity could or could not get
plinkitis, or that they did not know.
Results
The children’s thinking about the ontological categories was analysed as follows: first,
by ANOVAs on the children’s basic scores (i.e. the total number of entities out of five
chosen as susceptible to plinkitis within each of the six categories); secondly, by
Configural Frequency Analysis (CFA) on children’s responses for each category for
each of the three exemplars used. In addition, log linear analyses investigated any
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possible links between children’s significant response patterns (as generated by the
CFAs) and their age, health status or gender.
ANOVAs
The total number of cards for each ontological category placed by the child into the can
get plinkitis box was calculated; in each case, the scores could range from 0-5. The
mean scores obtained by the children were first analysed by using three 5-way 3 (age) x
2 (healthy vs CI) x 2 (gender) x 3 (exemplar) x 6 (type of ontological category) mixed
ANOVAs with independent groups on the first four factors and repeated measures on
the fifth factor (the number of can get plinkitis responses). This revealed main effects of
category as well as category by exemplar and category by group interaction effects.
Because of the category by exemplar interaction effects and the complexity of the
findings, the data were also analysed for each exemplar separately using three separate 3
(age) x 2 (gender) x 2 (healthy vs CI) x 6 (type of category) mixed ANOVAs, with
independent groups on the first 3 factors and repeated measures on the fourth factor.
There were main effects of type of category with all exemplars, indicating that children
do perceive differences between the various categories of entities when exemplars
belong to different ontological categories. However, as there were no significant effects
involving the children’s health status, Tables 1-3 do not separate out the healthy vs
chronically-ill children’s scores. All the significant effects found in the three ANOVAs
are shown at the foot of each table. The main effects of category were explored further
using Bonferroni-corrected post hoc t-tests and the results shown in Table 4.
For comparison purposes, the mean scores of the adult participants are also shown in
Tables 1-3. With respect to the child exemplar, the adults were significantly more likely
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than the Old group of children to generalise to mammals (t (66) = -2.23, p<.05), to non-
mammals (t (66) = -2.53. p<.05) and to birds (t (66) = -2.03, p<.05). With respect to the
dog exemplar, the adults were significantly more likely than the Old group of children
to generalise to mammals (t (69) = -2.00, p<.05), to non-mammals (t (69) = -2.44,
p<.05) and to birds (t (69) = -2.46, p<.05). With respect to the duck exemplar, the adults
were significantly more likely than the Old group of children to generalise to humans (t
(63) = -2.75, p<.05). All other differences between the adults and the Old group were
non-significant.
* * INSERT TABLES 1-4 ABOUT HERE * *
Differences Associated with Category
Children taught on the child exemplar claimed that humans were significantly more
likely than all the other categories to get plinkitis (see Tables 1 and 4). After human
beings, mammals were the most likely to get plinkitis, followed by birds, non-mammals
and plants. The category of hand-made artifacts was seen by children in all age-groups
as the least likely to get plinkitis. However, the differences between plants and hand-
made artifacts were not significant.
Children taught on the dog exemplar claimed that mammals were significantly more
likely than all the other categories to get plinkitis (see Tables 2 and 4). After mammals,
birds were the most likely to get plinkitis, followed by non-mammals/humans and then
by plants/hand-made artifacts. Again the category of hand-made artifacts was seen by
children in all age-groups as the least likely to get plinkitis. However, the differences
between humans and non-mammals, and between plants and hand-made artifacts, were
not significant.
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Children taught on the duck exemplar claimed that birds were significantly more likely
than all the other categories to get plinkitis (see Tables 3 and 4). After birds, mammals
were the most likely to get plinkitis, followed by non-mammals, and humans, and then
by plants. The category of hand-made artifacts was seen by children in all age-groups as
significantly the least likely to get plinkitis. However, the differences between humans
and non-mammals were not significant.
Differences Associated with Age
There were no main or interaction effects involving age on the can get plinkitis
responses with the child as exemplar. However, with children taught on the dog
exemplar, an interaction effect between category and age was revealed on the can get
plinkitis responses. Post hoc Scheffe tests (p<0.05) revealed that the Young group of
children was less likely to generalise to human beings than the Old group. In addition,
the Middle group of children was significantly more likely to generalise to birds than
the Old group.
Children taught on the duck exemplar also revealed an interaction effect between
category and age on the can get plinkitis responses. Post hoc Scheffe tests (p<0.05)
revealed that the Middle group of children was more likely to generalise to birds than
the Young group. There were no other significant differences within categories as a
function of age. There were no main or interaction effects associated with either health
status or gender on all three exemplars.
Configural Frequency Analysis
In addition to the age and category differences identified in the ANOVAS, it was
evident that different children presented different response patterns about the
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susceptibility to illness of entities belonging to different categories and according to
exemplar. In order to explore these variations, Configural Frequency Analysis (CFA)
was used. This form of non-parametric, multivariate analysis of association identifies
response patterns which are over-represented (types) and under-represented (anti-types)
given the null hypothesis that these patterns are normally and randomly distributed
(Krauth, 1985; Von Eye,1990). Focusing on the children’s choices of those entities
which can get ill, the children’s responses for each category were scored as follows: to
those children who chose two or less entities in a category (i.e. a minority of entities) a
score of 0 was given; to those children who chose three or more entities in a category
(i.e. a majority of entities) a score of 1 was given. Therefore, each child had a score of 0
or 1 for each category and the resulting reponse pattern for each participant could be
characterised as a sequence of 0s and 1s, with the six categories being represented in the
following order: humans, mammals, non-mammals, birds, plants and hand-made
artifacts. The data thus generated were subjected to three CFAs, one for each of the
three exemplars, child, dog and duck. The results are shown in Table 5, which reveals
two response patterns for the child exemplar, four response patterns for the dog
exemplar, and two responses patterns for the duck exemplar, all with frequencies
significantly greater than would be expected by chance.
* * INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE * *
Log Linear Analyses
The results of the CFAs showed the children’s judgement patterns on all three
exemplars. In order to investigate the existence of any associations between the
children’s judgement patterns and either their age, health status or gender, a new
variable was computed corresponding to whether or not each child presented each of the
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significant response judgement patterns. Three hierarchical log linear analyses were
conducted for each exemplar respectively. The results revealed one significant
association between gender and the children’s response patterns for the child exemplar
(2 (1) = 3.84, p < 0.05). Girls taught on the child exemplar were significantly more
likely than boys to generalise to humans only (Pattern 100000: 34 girls and 20 boys).
However, boys taught on the child exemplar were significantly more likely than girls to
generalise to humans, mammals, non-mammals and birds (Pattern 111100: 18 boys and
11 girls). No other significant associations were found between the children’s response
patterns and their age, health status or gender.
Discussion
This study set out to examine children’s conception of illness, using their naïve theory
of biology as a framework theory. The children’s assessments of susceptibility to illness
displayed an awareness of the distinctiveness of the ontological categories. Depending
on the exemplar used, the children’s thinking revealed discontinuities between every
category and its adjacent categories in almost all conditions (see Table 6). This supports
the view that children do possess an early grasp of biological distinctions (Keil, 1989;
Inagaki & Hatano, 1996).
* * INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE * *
The only exceptions were the non-significant differences between the categories of
plants and hand-made artifacts with the child and dog exemplars. The children
generalised least of all to the entities in these two categories, though significantly more
to the plants that the hand-made artifacts with respect to the duck exemplar. Contrary to
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the biological processes examined in other studies (Hatano et al., 1993; Backscheider et
al., 1993; Inagaki & Hatano, 1996), these findings suggest that plants may be less well-
established as a distinct biological category with regard to illness generalisation, than
the various animal (human, mammal, non-mammals and bird) categories amongst
children of this age. However, it may be that there were particular considerations in this
study which influenced the children’s responses regarding the plant category.
First, the category of plants may present particular difficulties for children when asked
to assess the likelihood of illness being transmitted to plants from other biological
entities. If children do hold to a model of illness based on infection or contagion
(Kalish, 1999), then the study required them to contemplate the methods for the
transmission of infection between plants and other categories. The children may have
concluded that the possibilities for transmission of plinkitis from humans or mammals
to plants were less than across animal species. Secondly, the description of plinkitis,
particularly with the reference to ‘dizziness’, ‘staying still’, and ‘temperature’ may have
made the illness sound an unlikely one for plants. It might have been preferable to use
more than one illness, and thus use a second imaginary illness with different symptoms,
more applicable to plants, though the increased complexity might have been taxing for
young children. Additionally, the actual reference to ‘illness’ itself may have caused
problems, as in the English language plants are generally described as suffering from a
disease rather than an illness. It might have been less confusing and closer to children’s
thinking to describe all the entities as ‘getting sick’. Finally, it may take children longer
to establish a concept of illness that can be generalised to plants+. Children generally
have good opportunities to observe such biological processes in plants as the need for
water and the ability to grow in size (Inagaki & Hatano, 1996) or the ability to heal
through re-growth after injury (Backscheider et al., 1993). However, not only is illness
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in plants a more uncommon phenomenon than taking in water or growing, but illness in
any biological entity, other than human, may be an unusual experience for children.
Therefore, children may require longer to attain a biological theory of illness and may
need more time to extend it to plants, with these delays affecting their understanding of
the status of plants in this particular study.
Differences in Children’s Thinking about Illness as a Function of Health Status
One of the main aims of this study had been to examine differences in children’s
understanding of illness as a function of health status. Therefore this study examined the
conceptual understanding of illness held by normally healthy and chronically-ill
children. However, the ANOVAs revealed no main or interaction effects involving the
children’s health status. Furthermore, the log linear analyses, conducted on the patterns
generated by the CFAs, also found no differences in the children’s judgement patterns
according to health status. These findings provide support for the view that the exposure
to a chronic disease and/or medical treatment does not necessarily result in greater
understanding of illness-related concepts (e.g. Perrin et al., 1991). They therefore run
counter to the belief that health status does affect children’s illness concepts (e.g.
Rubovits & Siegel, 1994).
However, there were some aspects of the study which may have affected any possible
difference in the thinking of the two groups of children. First, difficulties in obtaining a
sample of chronically-ill children resulted in a comparatively small number interviewed
for the study (96 chronically-ill as opposed to 291 healthy children). Unfortunately, this
was the maximum number of chronically-ill children that could be recruited for this
study from the participating hospital. An additional problem resulting from the
difficulties in obtaining chronically-ill children was the uneven distribution across the
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age groups, with the youngest children being over-represented and the oldest children
under-represented in the sample (44 Young group, 31 Middle group and 20 Old group
respectively. As some studies have suggested an interaction between age and
experience, with older chronically-ill children displaying greater illness understanding
(Campbell, 1975; Redpath & Rogers, 1984; Crisp et al, 1996), this relatively small
number of older chronically-ill children may have affected the outcome. However, the
consistency with which health status failed to show any effects in any of the analyses,
suggests that personal experience of chronic illness does not impact upon children’s
illness understanding, as measured by tasks tapping into their knowledge of ontological
categories.
Differences Associated with Age and Gender
There were also surprisingly few differences associated with age or gender. With
respect to the dog and duck exemplars, there were a few differences associated with age,
suggesting some minor variations in the children’s generalisation patterns at different
ages. However, when children were taught on the child exemplar, there were no
differences associated with age, with children in all three age groups making similar
generalisations. This overall absence of age-based effects counters the claim of Carey
(1985) that young children view humans as the prototypical entity. If this had been the
case, the youngest group of children would have been expected to generalise more from
the child exemplar than the older children. Furthermore, the overall paucity of
differences associated with age suggest that children’s illness concepts change relatively
little over the age-range examined.
However, there were some significant differences between the oldest children and the
adult participants, indicating that the oldest children’s thinking had not yet attained fully
20
adult-like understanding with respect to all categories and exemplars. With the child and
dog exemplars, the patterns were the same: while there were no significant differences
in generalisations to humans, plants or hand-made artifacts, adults were more likely to
generalise to mammals, non-mammals and birds, indicating that children were still
acquiring adult-like understanding of illness transference to these biological categories.
On the other hand, with respect to the duck exemplar, there was only one significant
difference between the oldest children and the adults: the children were significantly
less likely than the adults to generalise the illness to humans, suggesting that children
had yet to grasp the possibility of a disease contracted by birds being transferred to
humans.
In addition to the lack of differences associated with age, no differences associated with
gender were found in any of the ANOVAs conducted. There was one association with
gender in the log linear analyses of the CFA-generated patterns. This suggested that the
female participants were more likely than male to generalise plinkitis to humans only
when taught on the child exemplar. The general lack of gender effects suggests that
gender also may be discounted as a significant factor in children’s thinking about illness
concepts within the naïve theory of biology approach.
However, there are some alternative explanations for the lack of variations by age,
gender or health status. First, it is possible that all of the children had a good
understanding of the taxonomy presented so that no firm conclusions could be drawn
concerning the development of conceptions of illness. This could be explored in future
research by using a variety of properties in the task, including both illness and non-
illness aspects; if non-illness aspects show exactly the same pattern as illness aspects,
this would confirm children’s early grasp of biological taxonomies. Secondly, the
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children may have been responding on projections of similarity of entity, rather than
tapping their understanding of biological categories. This could be investigated by
assessing similarity judgements and examining any links with illness generalisations.
Differences Associated with Exemplars
However, while there were few effects associated with either age and gender, the
children did generalise differently according to which of the three exemplars they were
taught on, when assessing the illness susceptibility of entities belonging to the six
different categories. Children were significantly more likely to generalise to the same
ontological category as the one to which the exemplar itself belonged. In other words,
children tended to generalise more to the category of human beings when the child was
the exemplar, to the category of mammals when the dog was the exemplar, and to the
category of birds when taught on the duck exemplar.
Two different strategies have been proposed for children’s generalisation of biological
processes across ontological categories. Some researchers have suggested that young
children tend to underattribute unobservable animal properties such as breathing to
animals that are phylogenetically far from and physically dissimilar to humans (Carey,
1985; Inagaki & Sugiyama, 1988). If this were the case, it would be expected that an
imaginary illness such as plinkitis might elicit a similar pattern of generalisations from
the children as an unobservable property. With the human exemplar, the children did
tend to generalise first to humans, then to mammals, birds, non-mammals, and
plants/hand-made artifacts in this order, thus following a pattern of generalisation which
could have been based on how phylogenetically and physically different these entities
were in comparison to humans. However, this was not the case with the other two
exemplars; with both the dog and duck exemplars, the children were more likely to
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generalise plinkitis to entities in the same category as the exemplar, that is to other
mammals and birds respectively. Furthermore, with respect to the CFAs, the children
presenting significant patterns were more likely to generalise to other categories from
the dog and duck exemplars (62% and 77% respectively) than from the human exemplar
to other categories (32%). Therefore these results do not support the view that children’s
thinking is directed by a focus on human prototypicality.
The alternative strategy proposed for children’s generalisations is category membership
as opposed to surface or physical appearances (Flavell, 1985; Gelman & Markman,
1986; Wellman & Gelman, 1998). For example, Gelman and Markman (1986) found
that children as young as two and a half based their attributions of an unknown property
to biological entities on category membership rather than physical similarity despite
conflicting physical appearances. The findings of this study support the view that
children are capable of drawing their inferences from category membership, as for all
three exemplars the children generalised significantly more to the ontological category
to which the exemplar itself belonged. Thus the children’s generalisations revealed a
basic understanding of the distinctiveness of the different categories. This may be why
Carey’s (1985) finding of human prototypicality was not supported.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the children did reveal a naïve theory of biology through a basic
understanding of the various biological categories, as indicated by their generalisations
of illness. Their judgements were unaffected by their health status, however, and largely
unaffected by their age or gender. However, the children’s generalisations did indicate
that they were influenced by the type of exemplar on which they had been taught.
Furthermore, while there was some evidence that the children did perceive plants as a
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separate category, they seemed less sure of the biological status of plants. However, this
may have been due to specific aspects of the children’s illness understanding, rather
than an overall deficiency in their biological understanding.
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Table 1: Child Exemplar: children’s and adults’ mean responses to who can get plinkitis
(standard deviations in parentheses)
Can get plinkitis
children adults
Category young middle old total
Humans 3.93 (1.4) 4.60 (1.0) 4.58 (1.0) 4.32 (1.2) 4.80 (0.6)
Mammals 2.42 (1.8) 2.30 (1.9) 2.41 (2.0) 2.38 (1.9) 3.53 (2.2)
Non-mammals 2.01 (1.7) 1.50 (1.7) 1.41 (1.8) 1.68 (1.7) 2.60 (2.17)
Birds 2.00 (1.7) 1.97 (2.0) 2.13 (2.0) 2.03 (1.9) 3.13 (2.17)
Plants 0.62 (1.1) 0.17 (0.5) 0.08 (0.5) 0.33 (0.8) 0.33 (1.03)
Artifacts 0.32 (0.7) 0.02 (0.1) 0.10 (0.4) 0.17 (0.5) 0.10 (0.31)
mean scores 1.88 1.76 1.78 1.81
ANOVA category: F (5, 129) = 96.26, p< 0.001 Category: F (1, 29)
= 328.67, p<0.001
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Table 2: Dog Exemplar: children’s and adults’ mean responses to who can get plinkitis
(standard deviations in parentheses)
Can get plinkitis
children adults
Category young middle old total
Humans 1.58 (1.9) 2.18(2.3) 2.79 (2.3) 2.15 (2.2) 3.91 (2.1)
Mammals 3.54 (1.3) 4.04 (1.3) 4.02 (1.1) 3.85 (1.2) 4.52 (1.2)
Non-mammals 2.60 (1.5) 2.50 (1.7) 1.88 (1.6) 2.34 (1.6) 2.67 (1.9)
Birds 2.88 (1.6) 3.63 (1.7) 2.56 (1.9) 3.02 (1.8) 3.61 (2.0)
Plants 0.36 (0.6) 0.18 (0.6) 0.15 (0.8) 0.23 (0.6) 0.15 (0.7)
Artifacts 0.22 (0.5) 0.04 (0.2) 0.04 (0.2) 0.10 (0.3) 0
mean scores 1.86 2.09 1.90 1.94 2.49
ANOVA Category: F (5, 122) = 119.76, p< 0.001
Age x category: F(10, 242) = 2.64, p< 0.01
Category: F (1, 32)
= 95.82, p<0.001
Children:
Scheffe tests: significant differences between age groups
Humans: Young group vs Old group
Birds: Middle group vs Old group
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Table 3: Duck Exemplar: children’s and adults’ mean responses to who can get plinkitis
(standard deviations in parentheses)
Can get plinkitis
children adults
Category young middle old total
Humans 2.33 (2.0) 1.81 (2.2) 2.65 (2.3) 2.29 (2.2) 3.85 (2.1)
Mammals 3.24 (1.5) 3.05 (1.7) 3.00 (1.8) 3.11 (1.7) 3.85 (1.8)
Non-mammals 2.85 (1.4) 2.54 (1.7) 2.25 (1.4) 2.57 (1.5) 2.94 (1.9)
Birds 3.40 (1.3) 4.27 (1.0) 4.02 (1.1) 3.84 (1.2) 4.52 (1.1)
Plants 0.64 (1.2) 0.37 (0.8) 0.25 (0.8) 0.44 (1.0) 0.12 (0.4)
Artifacts 0.31 (0.7) 0.05 (0.2) 0.06 (0.3) 0.16 (0.5) 0.03 (0.2)
mean scores 2.12 2.01 2.03 2.06 2.55
ANOVA Category: F (5, 118) = 131.09, p< 0.001
Age x category: F(10, 234) = 2.324, p< 0.05
Category: F (1, 32)
107.74, p< 0.001
Children:
Scheffe tests: significant differences between age groups
Birds: Young group vs Middle group
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Table 4: Post hoc t-tests (Bonferroni corrected) to locate differences between
ontological categories and exemplar
Child
(t values)
df = 144
Dog
(t values)
df = 137
Duck
(t values)
df = 133
Humans v mammals 10.12** -8.40** -4.21**
Humans v non-mammals 14.37** ns Ns
Humans v plants 25.93** 7.48** 8.97**
Humans v birds 12.18** -3.60** -8.01**
Humans v artifacts 31.07** 10.26** 11.23**
Mammals v non-mammals 5.98** 11.22** 4.37**
Mammals v plants 12.46** 28.77** 15.59**
Mammals v birds 3.31** 6.20** -5.12**
Mammals v artifacts 13.51** 31.34** 19.14**
Non-mammals v plants 9.49** 14.08** 13.94**
Non-mammals v birds -3.13** -4.95** -8.73**
Non-mammals v artifacts 10.30** 15.33** 17.86**
Plants v birds 10.32** 17.36** 23.25**
Plants v artifacts ns ns 3.41**
Birds v artifacts 11.41** 18.15** 30.04**
p<0.003** ns = non-significant
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Table 5: Configural Frequency Analysis response patterns by exemplar (Bonferroni
corrected)
Exemplar Pattern* Frequency Z score
1 0 0 0 0 0 54 6.5Child
1 1 1 1 0 0 29 7.4
0 1 1 1 0 0 28 6.5
1 1 1 1 0 0 20 5.2
0 1 0 0 0 0 18 4.3
Dog
0 0 0 0 0 0 12 8.7
1 1 1 1 0 0 30 3.5Duck
0 0 0 0 0 0 9 5.4
*order of categories in pattern: humans, mammals, non-mammals, birds, plants and
artifacts
p<0.0007
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Table 6: Pattern of discontinuities between categories for all three exemplars
humans mammals non-
mammals
birds plants artifacts
child * * * *
dog * * * *
duck * * * * *
* asterisks denote the location of the significant differences between adjacent
ontological categories
